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Abstract 
Over the years, there has been global interest in the energy sector and its mechanism 
especially the huge and irreversible capital outlay ploughed into this industry. This 
interest has been strengthened by pivotal roles played by most energy (oil) producing 
countries of the world such as Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria 
etc in world economics as well as the advancement in the study of Petroleum 
Economics.  
 
This thesis examines the future of the West African Gas Pipeline Project on Gas Market 
development in the West African Sub Region exploring issues of pricing, third party 
access, finance and financing risk. 
 
I study the characteristics of gas market as a natural monopoly and proceeded to an 
overview of the nature of the gas industry in some European countries. Subsequently, I 
look at the theoretical approach to increasing gas supplies with a view to study how 
there could be varying incentive to invest in new gas capacity and new gas projects. 
Bearing in mind the role of finance in all this, the financing risk issues are discussed at 
great length while specific risks in gas projects are brought to light. 
 
The West African Gas Pipeline is also given prominent attention exploring all the issues 
that could arise during the course and after project completion. I conclude that if the 
pipeline company has access to supplies from more than one source, it would at least in 
the simplest cases buy only the cheapest source and the cost of gas from the next 
cheapest source would effectively put a limit on how much the cheapest supplier could 
get for his gas. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural Gas is a fossil fuel like oil and coal, produced as a result of chemical reaction 
under the earth crust in the remains of some organic material from earlier ages. Today, 
natural gas is the third world`s largest energy resource after coal and oil accounting for 
about 25 percent total primary energy supply. 
 
The demand for gas has been projected to increase over the next decades, mainly from 
the power sector of the less developed countries as well as the increasing usage to 
which it may be put. It is projected that gas consumption will double between now and 
2030 to the extent that it will most likely replace coal as the world`s second most 
important energy resource. 
 
Due to the high cost involved in transporting gas which therefore necessitates the need 
for gas production sites to be close to the consumption areas, gas exports and imports 
are heavily concentrated in a few countries. Today, only about 28 per cent of gas 
consumption is traded locally, with pipeline accounting for 75 per cent of total gas 
movements and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) for the rest. 
 
The proven reserves of natural gas have increased steadily over a couple of decades 
and moved faster than production by a significant margin. Although countries like 
Russia, Qatar and Iran hold about 57 percent of world`s gas reserves, gas is more 
widely distributed than oil.  
 
As stated earlier, transportation is a major issue limiting gas movements. There are two 
ways of transporting natural gas, by pipelines or in tanks in liquefied form. LNG is 
competitive only where the distances involved are greater than 4,000 kilometers. 
Transportation by Pipeline on the other hand is an economically cheaper means of 
transporting large volume of gas. It will therefore continue to play a major role in gas 
transportation e.g. from North Africa (Algeria) to Russia and growing markets in Europe, 
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Canada to United States and Latin America These are the centre of gas demand that 
needs to be supplied adequately as at when due and this is the reason it becomes 
imperative to continue to construct and lay gas pipelines regionally. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION  
Throughout the work in this thesis I have sought to answer the following question: 
“To what extent will pricing, Third party Access, finance and financing risks 
involved in the West African Gas Pipeline Project influence the Gas Market in the 
West African Sub Region?” 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate why and how pricing, third party access as 
well as the financing risks in the gas pipeline project may largely influence the 
international gas market. This thesis intends to explore the risks associated with the gas 
project as well as effect of third party access on Gas Market in the West African sub- 
region. That is, whether there are financing risks in gas development projects and its 
impact on gas import (export) price determination?  
1.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH AND ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
This research will adopt a descriptive methodology in analyzing the issues and 
describing the data in order to draw a far reaching conclusion based on the verifiable 
evidence to be gathered. Tools like charts, graphs and tables will be employed. 
The reason for this choice of approach is that qualitative method helps to provide a 
thorough, quick as well as an in-depth understanding of the various issues surrounding 
the subject under consideration which is gas market and gas development project than 
other approaches. However, the theoretical knowledge gained, in addition to models 
and quantitative analysis learned in Petroleum Economics and corporate Finance would 
be brought in when needed to drive home the underpinning of this thesis. 
  
The main sources of information for this thesis have been literature review on the topic 
as well as a bit of quantitative analysis on Petroleum Economics and Finance. 
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The organization of this thesis is as follows: The second chapter of this thesis 
discusses a general overview of gas as a classical natural monopoly looking at a simple 
process of price determination. Furthermore, an overview of the gas market in a few 
European countries is described to gain an insight into what would be obtainable in 
West Africa when the gas pipeline project is completed. Then, a theoretical model on 
increasing gas supplies is presented to anchor on the essence of studying the huge 
finance and financing risk involved in investing in new gas capacity as well as gas 
projects. This I am able to relate to the case in hand, the West African Gas Pipeline 
project. The third chapter dwells on institutional framework on issues that relates to 
gas pipeline project and project entity, state participation, project agreement as well as 
inter-governmental agreements. Chapter four discusses financing, risks associated 
with project financing as well as specific risks associated with gas project financing. In 
addition, a finance textbook model on asymmetric information between management of 
a company and potential investors is presented and applied to my case study. In 
chapter five, with chapter two, three and four in mind, I present the West African Gas 
Pipeline Project exploring all the issues involved. I analyze the case of a single producer 
of gas which in this case will be Nigeria delivering gas to a gas transmission company in 
other countries (involved in the West African Gas Pipeline Project) which in turn sell the 
gas to many local distribution companies. Finally, I draw the concluding remarks in 
chapter six 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 GAS MARKET AS A NATURAL MONOPOLY 
The huge capital costs of transporting gas have two implications for industrial 
structures. First, gas producers in Europe, Latin America and Africa have been reluctant 
to develop gas fields because they often fail to secure a long term commitment from 
buyers and in most cases, a joint venture in building the necessary transportation 
systems for gas movement. 
 
Second, the huge capital costs involved in pipelines and LNG systems make them a 
classic natural monopoly case. Most of the cost of transporting gas in a pipeline is fixed 
capital cost as the marginal cost of increasing gas flow is somewhat low. This natural 
monopoly case is enhanced by the fact that pipelines display increasing returns up to a 
point; pipeline cost are roughly proportionate to the radius of the pipeline while 
transportation capacity is nearly proportionate to the radius cubed.  
 
A natural monopoly is said to exist if it is less costly to satisfy demand with only one 
company in the market than with two or more firms. The natural monopoly as result of 
increasing return to scale causes poses a well known economic problem which can be 
described using  Hannesson Petroleum Economics textbook diagram on monopoly.  
       Figure 1 
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A monopolist sets a price where marginal revenue (MR) equals to the marginal cost. 
This implies a higher tariff than the full cost solution and less volume of gas transported 
(Qm instead of Qfc) and excludes still more units for which willing buyers of gas are 
ready to pay additional transportation cost. 
 
For the monopolist to solve this problem, it becomes imperative to apply a double 
pricing where one part is payment for access to pipeline and the other, payment for off-
take of gas. This tariff structure can in principle recover the huge capital cost without 
necessarily discouraging the transportation of gas for which buyers are willing to pay the 
marginal cost. However, this high cost may not be easily defrayed as most pipeline 
construction and transnational gas project have long gestation period due to 
infrastructural requirements and different stages of development 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF GAS MARKET IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
ITALY 
The Italian gas market ranks as the third largest market in Europe. Gas production in 
Italy is mainly controlled by ENI through its Exploration and Production division with a 
number of small producers. The structure of the Italian gas market is such that under 
the decree 2000, ENI and its smaller competitors are required to undertake corporate 
separation of their gas operations into production and imports, transmission and storage 
as well as distribution and sales. By the report of IEA, it is projected that existing 
infrastructures will not be able to meet forecast growth in Italian gas. At the moment the 
majority of the country`s gas demand is met by  imports and gas prices are significantly 
higher than the European average creating opportunities for new players and those 
looking to expand their presence.1.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 www.globalbusinessinsights.com/content/rbmk0002m.pdf 
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GERMANY 
The German gas market is organized under civil law and takes place largely at three 
levels: 
 Import and production  
 Transportation and distribution 
 Regional distribution/distribution to end users 
 
The German gas market is made up of some 750 independent companies. Production 
companies and cross regional companies are charged with supplying natural gas from 
Germany and beyond to gas companies, households businesses and industry.2 
 
Some few years ago, the gas business in Germany was characterized by long term gas 
purchase contracts linked to the price of oil. Today, the terms for transactions between 
the transporter and traders are becoming shorter. For gas transport companies, this 
creates the need to offer the market services for gas transport and gas storage tailored 
towards customer request.3 
 
BELGIUM 
Belgium derives almost 40% of its energy needs from natural gas, all of which is 
imported. Gas consumption has increased about 30% between 1998 and 2009 and a 
large amount of this increase is due to a sharp rise in gas utilization for electricity 
generation purpose. Few years ago, Distrigas has monopoly rights to distribute gas to 
local utilities in Belgium. However, with the liberalization of the Belgian natural gas 
market, freely chosen supplier could now meet 91.5% of Belgian demand for natural 
gas. Just like it happened in the case of electricity market, gas companies were divided 
to avoid conflicts of interest, separating transport and distribution from sales.4 
                                                          
2
 http://www.distrigas.eu/content/germany/de-en/natural-gas-de-en/european-market-de-en.html 
3
 http://www.moffatt-associates.com/energy_services/forecasting_market_trends/energy 
 
4
 http://www.nam.org/Resource-Center/Export-Promotion/Market-Research/Market- 
Research/~/media/8E9445F4E8374E16A2CC77E4341CF738.ashx 
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FRANCE 
Today the gas market in France is controlled by Gaz de France (GdF) which directly or 
indirectly operates at all levels- imports/ wholesales, transmission, distribution and 
supply.5 Gaz de France has monopoly rights to import and distribute gas to local 
distributors. Nearly all the gas is imported in France For most of its supply, the French 
gas market relies heavily on long term contracts between the incumbent suppliers and 
national companies. 
 
NETHERLAND 
Netherland is a major gas producer and also exports to other member states. Imports 
from Russia and Norway have been increasing in recent years. In Netherland, a 
company called Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij's (NAM) is one of the largest 
producers of natural gas and is a subsidiary of Exxon (50%) and Shell (50%). Between 
2001 t0 2008, the number of players on the gas wholesale market has increased 
considerably from about eight to seventy players. The incumbent wholesaler Gas Terra 
controls around 80% of the available gas. 
 
The Dutch gas retail market consists of three large suppliers who dominate the market 
and a larger number of small suppliers6. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/market/market_fr_en.pdf 
6
 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/market/market_nl_en.pdf 
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2.2 THEORETICAL MODEL ON INCREASING GAS SUPPLIES 
In order to have a thorough understanding of the mechanism involved in gas projects as 
well as gas supplying capacity, I will briefly present and apply a model from Hannesson 
(1998). The Hannesson model will be applied to the West African Gas Pipeline project 
in which only one producer of gas (Nigeria in this case) delivers to a gas transmission 
company in other countries like Ghana, Togo or Benin which in turn sells natural gas to 
local distribution companies. Obviously, this is not a true representation in European 
continent but this case will most probably occur in the West African Gas market once 
the pipeline project is completed. 
 
To apply this bilateral monopoly scenario, I shall defer the theoretical model till chapter 
five when the West African Gas Pipeline project would have been fully described. 
 
The Hannesson model also gives an overview of a market with a third party access to a 
gas pipeline and two sellers. In this hypothetical market, there is one low cost and one 
high-cost supplier and the model analyze their decision to invest or not to invest in new 
production capacity. 
 
This thesis uses the model to analyze a situation with one buyer of gas and two types of 
suppliers. One of the two suppliers has low cost of production while the other has high 
costs. Owing to security of supply issue, there is a desire not to import more than a 
certain quantity of gas from the low-cost suppliers even if this was possible. Suppose 
the low cost/ high risk supplier will consist of Russian piped gas or Algerian gas and 
potential supplies by Iran. High cost/ low-cost supplier would be EU indigenous supply, 
Norway (both pipe and LNG). I will assume that the aforementioned two groups act like 
two players in the market and hence they coordinate their action. Subsequently, I will 
use the theoretical framework to analyze the impact of investing in new capacity by the 
supplier as well as the effect of having more buyers of gas. 
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Let the Demand for natural gas be represented by a linear function.  
 
(1)  P = a-bQ    
I shall assume that transportation is ignored while P is price net of cost. 
 
Due to security of supply issues which will be described later in subsequent chapter, the 
buyer will diversify its supplies by importing a fixed amount α from the low-cost 
producers and thus a fixed share 1-α from the high-cost suppliers. 
 
This gives us  
(2)  Ql = αQ and Qh = (1-α)Q, where Ql + Qh = Q   
 
Here Ql is quantity supplied by low-cost supplier while Q is the given quantity of gas. 
 
It is assumed that α is known and fixed but in the real world this is not often true. In real 
life, it is most likely that the importing region will have a varying α. The total profit on the 
gas purchase will be  
 
(3)  P(Q)Q – αQCl – (1-α)QCh     
Here, the prices paid to the producers from the importers net out. So, the first order 
condition (FOC) associated with equation (3) above which represent the maximum profit 
to be shared gives 
 
(4)  P + P’Q = αQCl + (1-α)QCh     
 
The profit obtained by each group of suppliers will now be 
 
(5)  Πl = Ql(Sl-Cl), Πh = Qh(Sh-Ch)     
 
and the profit obtained by the importer is 
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(6)  Πlmp = Ql(P(Q) – Sl) + Qh(P(Q) – Sh),     
 
If I assume the importer and the producer will share profit equally, then we would have 
 
(7)  Sl = Cl + ½ (P-Cl),  Sh = Ch + ½ (P-Ch)    
 
If we use values to represent the variables as follows a=10, b=0.5, Cl=2, Ch=4, and 
α=0.5, we get Q=3.5, P=6.5, Sl=4.25 and Sh=5.25 
 
Clearly, the price paid to the producers will be in the range of 4.25 to 5.25 and there is a 
substantial price difference. This price difference exists because of the obligation to 
diversify imports. This means as long as this obligation is in place, one may observe 
that importing countries like Spain may be more willing to pay more for liquefied natural 
gas from say a country like Norway than LNG or piped gas from Algeria.  
 
A significant price difference shown in the analysis above will give greater but different 
investment incentives to invest in gas projects in different regions. Producers who are 
considered safe suppliers may invest in gas projects with higher costs than producers 
who are not considered safe suppliers because the safe suppliers can charge a higher 
price for gas.  
 
I will now consider several propositions or scenarios in order to expatiate on the above 
analysis. 
Proposition 1- What if the gas market is liberalized? 
This means more players are now allowed to import gas and the obligation to buy 50% 
of the total quantum from each supplier is relaxed. This can be said to be partly what 
has happened in Europe recently with liberalization and deregulation of the gas market, 
entrance of new importers and the relaxation of import restriction on Russian gas. 
To analyze this, it is necessary to classify the competition between two groups of 
suppliers. The conventional classification separates between whether price or quantity 
is the decision variable. Assuming price is the decision variable (Bertrand competition), 
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the low cost producers will reduce their price to a level slightly below the marginal cost 
of the high cost producers, thus capturing the market. By implication, the only way for 
the high-cost suppliers to be in the market will be for reasons of diversification, as there 
will not be any room for him to operate until the low-cost suppliers have exhausted his 
reserves. This type of competition assumes that the low-cost suppliers have the 
capacity to supply the needed quantity at a fixed marginal cost. This assumption is not 
however feasible in reality. 
 
The other type of competition involves using quantity as the decision variable. This is 
more likely due to the huge capital cost involved in building new production capacity. 
With quantity as decision variable, each group of producers will now decide how much 
gas to supply taking into consideration the amount of gas that will be supplied by the 
other group of suppliers. In this case, there will be no price difference between the two 
groups of suppliers as there is no supply constraint. Two situations will therefore apply 
here, one will be where both group of supplier make their decisions simultaneously 
(Cournot competition) and the other situation will be where one of the players has the 
advantage of being the first to make decision (Stackelberg competition) 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will analyze the situation using Cournot competition. 
 
The Revenue (R) of each supplier i is given by multiplying quantity sold by the same 
supplier quantity (Qi)  
 
(8)  Ri = Qi – bQQi, i=l,h, Q= Ql + Qh    
 
The marginal revenue (MR) given the quantity supplied by the other supplier is  
 
(9)  a - bQj – 2bQi,   i,j = l,h, j ≠ i    
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For each player, the optimal solution occurs where the marginal cost (MC) equates 
marginal revenue (MR). To ensure consistency in the solution, the quantity supplied by 
each player must end up being the same as what the other supplier assumed.    
 
Setting the MR=MC and solving the equations give 
 
(10)  Qi = (a + Cj – 2Ci)/3b, i,j, = l,h; j ≠ i    
 
The solution in this equation thus gives P=5.33 and Q= 4.67 which consists of Ql= 3.33 
and Qh=1.33 
 
Πl (Profit of the low-cost supplier) will be slightly less than 12 under Bertrand 
competition and 11.09 under Cournot competition. 
 
As shown the high-cost suppliers will reduce their quantum of supplies while the low-
cost suppliers will increase their quantum compared to the situation where buyers are 
obliged to buy half of their supplies from each supplier. The end result will be an 
increase in supply of gas as the low-cost suppliers will increase supplies by more than 
what the high-cost suppliers lower by.  
 
In practice, the high-cost suppliers may lower their supply even more because of 
waning reserves as well higher cost for the gas that is left.  
 
In the case of the West African Gas Market, this is not the true situation as I shall 
expatiate in Chapter five. There is no mechanism in place to liberalize the market now 
as the gas market is still at the developing stage but it is most likely that the proposition 
presented above will feature in the market when many players are involved. 
 
Proposition 2- What if the supply of gas is treated as finite? 
The model adopted in the foregoing analysis treat the supply of gas as being infinite but 
this not actually true as gas resources is finite in nature. Suppose high-cost suppliers 
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have 50 units of reserves while low-cost supplier have 100 units. Under the Cournot 
competition, the low-cost suppliers would like to supply 3.33 units. To do this the low-
cost suppliers must expand capacity by 1.58. There is a certain lead time for this 
expansion project. 
 
The present value of the profit for supplier i can be expressed as equation (11)  
 T1                                       T2        T3 
∫P(Σ Q1,j )Q1,i e-rt dt +∫P(Σ Q2, j )Q2,i e-rt dt +∫P(Σ Q3,j )Q3,i e-rt dt -Ki 
  0                                   1                     2 
 
The notation i represents supplier, either low-cost supplier or high-cost supplier. 
T1= time it takes to build new capacity. Production in this phase is Q1. 
T2= one player runs out of reserves. 
T3= Here, all reserves gone. 
K=present value of investing in new capacity. 
Ki= the present value of investment in new capacity by low-cost supplier or high-cost 
supplier. 
 
The future period here is divided into three (3) phases. The first phase can be described 
as the time it takes to build the new capacity. The second phase is where the new 
capacity has come on stream and both the low-cost suppliers and high-cost suppliers 
will be deemed to producing. In the last phase, the suppliers with the least resources 
have run out of reserves and there is only one group of suppliers still producing. K is the 
present value of the investment in new capacity and r is the discount rate. Here, I have 
ignored operating costs. 
 
We can assume that both the low-cost and high-cost suppliers have the possibility of 
doubling their capacity at a cost K. The lead time will be five years (T=5) and because 
expanding production capacity is visible, it is also assumed that both kinds of suppliers 
will be able to increase capacity simultaneously. 
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If both kinds of suppliers invest in new capacity, price will decline to 3, while if only one 
of them invest and expands, the price will be 4.75.Now, if the low-cost suppliers with 
large reserves choose to expand, their price will be 6.5 in the last period compared with 
8.25 if they keep their capacity unchanged. 
 
The figures Cl=2 and Ch=4 which are inserted into equation (7) can be interpreted as the 
cost per unit per year for the low-cost and high-cost producers respectively. These are 
thus the break even prices. 
 
Using a discount rate of 0.1, the present value at time zero for an annual production of 
1.75 units until the reserves are emptied is 66 for the high-cost suppliers at a price of 4, 
and 35 for the low-cost producers at a price of 2. If production is starting at time zero 
and the cost of doubling the capacity is the same as the cost of initial capacity, 66 and 
35 would be the values for K for the two kinds of producers. The results for the two 
suppliers in the four different scenarios can be represented in a payoff matrix as follows.  
Table 1 
High-cost/Low cost supplier No investment Investment 
No investment 102.2;   115 90.4;    103.9 
Investment 48.6;     106.1 22.8;    86.1 
Payoff to high cost producers; payoff to low cost producers 
 
The dominant strategy for either supplier would be not to invest regardless of whatever 
the other supplier does. Even if the pipeline company were obliged to transport gas at a 
fair rate, the producers will not be interested in supplying anymore and the only effect of 
liberalization would be to deprive the pipeline company of its share in the profit. 
 
However, this result depends on the total cost of new capacity. If the cost is say 20 and 
10 for the high-cost and low-cost suppliers respectively, the pay off matrix result will be 
as follows  
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Table 2 
High-cost/Low cost supplier No investment Investment 
No investment 107.2;    115 90.4;    128.9 
Investment 94.6;      106.1 68.8;    111.1 
Payoff to high cost producers; payoff to low cost producers 
 
In this case, the low-cost supplier will choose to invest while the high cost supplier will 
refrain from investing. This means that the capacity will increase to 4.25 and the price 
will fall from 6.5 to 4.75 in the second phase.  
 
This shows that the cost level of new capacity is important and can be critical to 
investment in new gas projects. This is a relevant and important conclusion as the costs 
of the LNG chain have declined over the years. 
 
In addition, the analysis above shows that the high-cost suppliers lose when relaxing 
the security of supply (denoted by α). This is however natural as there would be less 
incentive to pay more for low-risk suppliers if one is not obliged to do so. With the ever-
changing international relations, security of supply may soon in increase in importance 
and low-risk suppliers might be able to charge a higher price if the market attaches a 
risk premium from certain sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Petroleum Economics by Røgnvaldur Hannesson (1998) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 GAS PIPELINE PROJECT AND PROJECT ENTITY 
A transnational gas pipeline project is a gas development project that spans across 
more than one country. There are two forms of transnational gas projects namely: the 
Liquefied Natural Gas and Pipelines. Cross border pipelines traverse long distances 
running through another country to deliver oil and gas to markets in third country7. 
 
The purpose of building a transnational gas pipeline project often determines the type of 
project entity to be used in carrying out the project. For instance, the purpose could be 
that the pipeline is an extension of an upstream development provided for the purpose 
of moving a product to market or is developed as a part of a regional infrastructure by 
those in the business of building or operating pipelines8.  
 
Where the pipeline is being developed by the upstream gas owner to move their product 
to the market, the pipeline is seen as being part of their upstream infrastructure. An 
unincorporated venture may be used by parties in a production sharing agreement in 
this instance as the pipeline entity. However, if the pipeline is a transmission 
infrastructure such that pipeline promoter may or may not have production interest, a 
limited liability company is likely to be used. 
 
Other issues that may likely affect the type of project entity to be used include:  
i. Taxation. 
ii. National investment laws. 
iii. Requirement for local participation. 
iv. The extent of risk and liability protection the sponsors wish to get. 
v. The ease with which profit can be extracted by the sponsors. 
vi. Flexibility of management structure. 
vii. Ease of dissolution. 
 
                                                          
7
 P.  Stevens, A History of Transit Pipelines in the Middle East: Lessons for the future, 6 (CEPMLP, 1996). 
8
 Griffin supra note 10, at 73. 
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However, where the pipelines cross different countries with separate national laws as it 
is in the case of transnational project, the pipelines are separated into national parts but 
linked together under a single agreement. 
 
The selection of the type of project entity will affect the timing of taking relief for 
expenditures and who may actually take the relief though it will not affect the liability to 
pay tax on the business venture. A joint venture company will normally have tax 
liabilities in each country where it passes and be subject to the domestic laws of such 
territories and the provisions of any applicable Host Government Agreement. A limited 
liability company will be liable to tax in the jurisdiction where it is resident. If however a 
non-corporate joint venture is used as a project entity, the venture has no tax distinct 
from that of the joint venturer. 
 
3.1 STATE PARTICIPATION 
The involvement of the state in a transnational gas pipeline project is crucial to give 
credibility and assurance to the sponsors on matters such as legal security and stability 
of their investments. This becomes very important especially when the mode of 
financing the project comes via equity or bond. In most cases, providers of capital will 
demand for huge commitment from the state to provide extra assurance before parting 
with fund on the project. The sponsors usually demand to have the right to 
i) Acquire title to the asset. 
ii) Develop and implement the project. 
iii) Import foreign labour. 
iv) Operate the pipeline. 
v) Repatriate profits and capital. 
 
As most construction of pipelines requires government sanction, the permanent use of 
land needed for such project also requires state approval. In addition, the likelihood of 
market failure also brings in government into the picture. The threat of sudden change 
in law such as taxation law, accounting standards, foreign exchange controls and labour 
laws must be taken into consideration.  
18 
 
Usually, the state will play two important roles both as a facilitator and supporter of the 
implementation and operation of the project. The State like any other stakeholder often 
seeks more direct participation as an equity investor in transnational gas pipeline 
projects. This is to lend support to the implementation and take off of the project with a 
view to earning dividend later on. 
                                                     
3.2  PROJECT AGREEMENT 
Project agreement for a transnational gas pipeline covers international agreements and 
treaties, inter-governmental, host government, transportation and financing agreements 
etc. All these agreements will have a far reaching consequence on gas pipeline project. 
The project entity and individual participants to the project will not have any input into 
these agreements as they are strictly state matters. 
 
In addition, there will also be agreement on the production of the gas to be transported 
through pipeline. Such an agreement may include development and host government 
arrangement, the grant of concession or the making of production sharing agreements 
(PSAs). In situation where the owners of the pipelines are not the owners of gas to be 
transported through the pipeline, then a transportation agreement is needed. 
 
This transportation agreement will be contracted as an agreement between a gas 
transporter (pipeline owner) and gas shipper (owner of the gas). Also, part of the 
contents of the agreement will deal with issues such as allocation and priorities within 
the pipelines. The arrangements for sale and purchase of gas transported through 
transnational pipeline are normally complex. Such agreements are usually made 
between the owners of the gas and the state. Where debt funding is involved in the 
financing of the pipeline project, then further lending agreements between the lenders 
and sponsors are documented.  
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3.3 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS  
Some of the issues that will be dealt with under inter-governmental agreements that are 
central to the success of any transnational gas pipeline projects include:  
i) Identification of the territory of each of the participating states and matters of 
boundary and other territorial disputes.  
ii) Commitment of each participating State to the project. 
iii) Protection of investment in each participating State  
iv) Granting of land rights and necessary consents and authorization.  
v) Commitment to freedom of transit. 
vi) Safety and security of the project. 
vii) Creation of a fiscal regime in relation to the proposed pipeline and pipeline tariffs 
and their regulation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 FINANCING 
Energy project such as gas development fields and pipeline construction requires huge 
capital outlay. Due to the capital intensive nature as well as the riskiness of the project, 
the need to source for external funds is inevitable. Generally, the mode of financing will 
be determined by purpose of the project and the nature of the participants. Also the 
financial and technological means of conducting this crucial task of energy projects 
have not always been readily or totally available within national border, hence the need 
for varying degree of external investment and expertise9.  
 
Basically there are four different approaches to financing a transnational gas pipeline 
project. 
 
4.1 TYPES OF FINANCING 
4.1.1  Equity Financing 
This is a form of financing whereby the project sponsors contribute their own fund to 
carry out the project. Personal fund of the sponsors could be from their internally 
generated revenue to the extent that they are available. In most cases, only the largest 
producers in the oil and gas industry can fund large development by means of equity as 
they have access to capital markets10. 
 
4.1.2  Debt Financing 
This is financing carried out by borrowing either from private investors or banks. The 
different forms of borrowing used in oil and gas project are11: 
i) Lease Financing: This occurs when the providers of capital retain both the title 
and ownership of an asset and then lease the asset out on a long term basis to a 
                                                          
9
 H. Zakaiya, The Petroleum Lending Program of the World Bank, 17 Journal of World Trade Law  p.471(1983) 
10
 D.Winfield, Oil and Gas Financing Agreements in Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements   138(1996) 
11
 See Winfield supra note 42, at 138. 
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lessee, usually for the whole life span of the asset. All the risks and rewards of 
the assets are transferred to the lessee.  
ii) Bank loan: This is a facility taken from commercial bank. Large debt facilities are 
done through a syndicate of banks and this would largely depend on the identity 
of both borrowers and lenders 
iii) Public Bond Issues: Public Bond issues are available in international capital 
markets, though they are accessible to only large companies with internationally 
certified credit ratings.  
 
4.1.3  Industry Financing 
Industry financing is peculiar to the oil and gas industry as it typically involves 
transactions between producers as against producers and providers of capital. The 
common methods are as follows: 
i) Net Profit Interest: A contractual agreement is signed on the sale of petroleum to 
be won from a field. The sale is premised on the agreement that the transferor 
receives a future share of the field income stream determined by reference to the 
future performance of the field.  
ii) Farm in: In a farm-in-agreement, the transferor sells part of its interest in a 
particular field to another party prior to the actual commencement of the 
development of the field. The sale is done on terms and agreement that the 
transferor fund all or part of the cost of developing the transferor`s retained 
interest. 
iii) Carried interest: This involves one consortium member funding the expenditure 
of a second member on terms that the first will retain a specified share of the 
future production entitlement of the second. The specified share will enable the 
funder to recover the development cost incurred in respect of the carried interest 
plus a financing charge. 
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4.2 SOURCES OF FINANCE 
There are different ways of financing transnational gas pipeline projects ranging from 
equity investment, non-recourse loans etc. However, for the purpose of this thesis, 
finance sources classification shall be broadly divided along two major lines of providers 
of capital - commercial lenders and commercial sponsors. 
 
4.2.1 Commercial Lenders 
i) Banks –commercial and investment banks 
ii) Institutional investors 
iii) Leasing companies 
iv) Savings and loans associations 
v) Investment mortgage companies 
vi) Money market funds. 
 
4.2.2 Commercial Sponsors 
i) International agencies (The World Bank, EBRD) 
ii) Government Export Financing Agencies 
iii) Companies requiring the product or services 
iv) Trade Creditors 
v) Contractor 
 
4.3 PROJECT FINANCING  
Project Financing has become a major source of finance in the energy industry in recent 
times. In project financing, a legally independent project company, usually one that 
builds, or builds and operates, an industrial plant or a piece of infrastructure is set up by 
other pre-existing companies in commercial sector related to that of the project 
company12. These enterprises invest as shareholders in the project company and are 
called sponsors of the project company. 
                                                          
12
 Kensinger J., & Martin J.D., “Project Finance: Raising Money the Old-Fashioned Way” 1 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 69 (1988). 
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Crucially, the project company also relies heavily on loans from banks to get 
established. These loans supply the bulk of finance for the project company and are 
secured against the future revenues of the finished project, not against the asset of the 
sponsors. For example, the oil multinational BP, sometimes with partners, is a sponsor 
of certain pipeline projects in various parts of the world. If the project company runs into 
difficulty servicing its debts, lenders have no claims on BP`s assets-project funding is 
“non recourse”- but BP`s shareholding will decline in value. So while BP and sponsors 
in general run risks in project finance, the risks arising from unpaid debt are mainly 
borne by private and public sector banks. Since project companies are largely financed 
from bank loans, the risk of unpaid debt can be significant. However, private banks 
would run these risks on the condition that they are senior lenders; they are first in the 
queue for project revenues and also for the proceeds of asset sales for project 
companies that default on loans. 
 
Project finance is a combination of debt and equity financing. The equity serves as a 
risk capital in the project to the lenders as well as measure of comfort which gives 
confidence to the sponsors. The basis for project financing is that the project should be 
capable of earning sufficient revenue that would serve the project debt and also provide 
the sponsor with a completely non recourse debt so that it doesn’t affect the sponsor`s 
balance sheet. If however the project debt affect the sponsor`s balance sheet, the 
negative impact is on the gearing level of the sponsor. This will restrict the ability of the 
sponsor to have access to the financial market. Project financing is a kind of asset 
based financing empowers the lenders to have recourse only to the “underlying assets” 
of the project. 
 
The project`s capacity for a predictable revenue stream is what sustain the project 
economics and enhances the lenders decision making and provide a reasonable level 
of assurance. Fundamental to such financing is the lender`s requirement is that the off 
taker is credit worthy so as to ensure that payments will be made to project company in 
order to service the interest on the debt and repay the repay the principal amount of the 
loan. 
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The size of the capital outlay involved in many projects in the energy industry made 
project financing a popular option. Even Multinationals are being confronted with 
financial difficulties and they seek to get the required fund through project finance rather 
than through traditional means which has proved to be unsatisfactory. Project financing 
includes features that allow project sponsors to share risk with lenders as compared to 
corporate or balance sheet lending. It relies on sharing risks between the lenders and 
other parties in a manner that envisage that the various obligations and risks would be 
met by the parties best able to bear them.  
 
Project Financing involves both debt and equity where the debt to equity ratio is typically 
large (as much as 70% debt and 30% equity). It is well known that debt is cheaper than 
equity; therefore when debt is available, cheap and is the least expensive form of 
financing, project financing becomes a choice.13 The revenue from the project before 
interest, taxes and depreciation must be able to generate adequate returns to equity 
holders and pay both the interest and the principal on the debt as well as all associated 
costs. Project finance is essentially about risk-return trade off. It allocates project risk to 
the parties that are most competent to absorb those risks and ensuring that there are 
adequate returns to compensate taking the risks. A project is not considered bankable 
where risks that is crucial and central to the potential earnings of the project have not 
been identified, allocated and mitigated within the project structure to the lender 
satisfaction14. 
 
4.4 PARTIES TO A PROJECT 
4.4.1 Project Sponsors 
Project Sponsors are similar to initial promoters of a corporate entity who can either be 
public or private sector sponsors. While public sector sponsor refers to the state or 
government, the private sectors are mostly individuals, companies or a consortium of 
both. A project could have just one company or a consortium of interested parties 
                                                          
13
 See Nevitt supra note 43, at 1. 
 
14
 T.H. Donaldson, (ed.), and J Morgan, The Traditional Approach in Project Lending’ in Project Lending, 4-5(1992). 
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involving contractors, suppliers, users of the project`s product whose mutual interest is 
to ensure that the project comes to operation15. The objectives of private sector 
sponsors will include the following: 
i) To maximize stockholders` wealth by making adequate returns  
ii) To satisfy strategic corporate objective  
iii) To diversify their risk portfolio 
 
4.4.2 Project Company 
A project company can be described as the economic unit through which the project 
sponsor is carrying out the project. In most cases, a Special Purpose Vehicle is 
incorporated depending on the legal and regulatory requirements of the host country. It 
is also possible that a project company may not be the borrower in project finance 
depending on the view of the sponsors on issue that bothers on tax consideration, 
effects of foreign exchange control on the project, availability of security for the project 
and the enforceability of claims in the host country. 
 
4.4.3 The Lenders 
The full cost of an average transnational gas pipeline project is estimated to be about 
$600m and this makes it difficult for a single lender to be involved. The common 
practice is for a syndicate of banks to pool the funds needed for the project. The 
syndicate could consist of foreign banks; local banks, export credit and multilateral 
credit agencies. In order to mitigate against expropriation risk, a syndicate of banks and 
multilateral agencies will come together to fund such project. Thus, little or no 
interference will be allowed from the host government as it is only expected to ensure 
that revenue earned are used in servicing both the loan interest and principal. Other 
aims of the lenders will include: 
i) To make a profit based on interest charged on the loan 
ii) To assume only measurable or measured risks 
iii) To have control over key project decisions and ; 
iv) To take control of the project as soon as possible in times of hardship.16 
                                                          
15
 C. Clifford, Project Finance, 9 (1996). 
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4.4.4 Host Government 
The host government act as a major backer to the project and in most cases does not 
participate directly in project finance as a borrower to the project even though it might 
take an equity interest through the state oil company or parastatal. The host 
government plays a major role in providing support and undertakings, granting of 
necessary concessions, award of operating licenses, providing fiscal incentives such as 
tax benefits and could provide foreign exchange availability guarantee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16
 See Vinter  supra note 15, at 4. 
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4.5 A SIMPLE MODEL ON SOURCING FOR FINANCE 
Here I will apply a simple finance textbook17 model in a situation where the 
management of a project company faces a big challenge when raising finance from the 
market due to asymmetric information. Let us consider a project company that is all 
equity financed. There are two states in the world, the peach (Good) and lemon (Bad) 
states. Each state is equally likely. In the peach state, the project company has assets 
in place with a value of β. In the lemon state, the project company`s asset in place is α. 
 
The project company is seeking to finance a gas pipeline project that cost µ and has an 
NPV of € in both states. The project company is considering financing the project by 
issuing equity. Let us assume that the managers of the company know which state the 
firm is and they seek to maximize value to existing shareholders. 
 
Proposition I 
If the project sponsor or investors can identify the state of the project company, the 
dilution in the peach state will be  
     Π peach =   µ 
             β +µ+€ 
 
In the lemon state, the fair dilution will be  
     Π lemon =   µ 
             α +µ+€ 
Π is the dilution factor. Here Π>0.  
Let us represent the fair dilution in the peach and lemon state to be ℗ and ℓ respectively 
replacing the above fractions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Adapted from Brealey, Richard A. og Stewart C. Myers (2008): Principles of Corporate Finance. 
9th ed. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, Boston, Mass. 
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Proposition II 
Assume from now that the project sponsors cannot identify the state (they view the two 
states as equally likely), the market dilution will be  
 
                        Π market =              µ 
             0.5(α +€) +0.5(β+€) + µ 
This can simply be denoted by ∂ 
Proposition III 
Let us suppose the project company is in the peach state, the maximum dilution the 
company would accept is  
                 (1- Π peach max) (β+€ + µ)  ≥ β 
        (β+€ + µ)- (Π peach max) (β+€ + µ)  ≥ β 
       Π peach max ≤     € + µ 
          β+€ + µ 
 
For simplicity, let us replace the fraction above with Ω, such that the maximum dilution 
the project company would accept from the investors in this state is Ω. 
 
Proposition IV 
In the same vein, assume the project company is in lemon state, the maximum dilution 
the company would accept is  
                 (1- Π lemon max) (α +€ + µ)  ≥ α 
        (α +€ + µ)- (Π lemon max) (β+€ + µ)  ≥ α 
       Π lemon max ≤     € + µ 
          α +€ + µ 
Similarly, the fraction above can be replaced with ₱ for the sake of simplicity. 
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Analysis 
Suppose it turns out that in the peach, the maximum dilution Ω the project company 
would accept is lower than what the project investors want to offer ∂, which means the 
dilution is so high that the existing project company shareholders lose, the project 
company will face a tradeoff between selling undervalued asset and foregoing the gas 
pipeline project. Here, external equity to finance the gas pipeline project is expensive. 
Hence, it will not undertake the gas projects. 
 
However, if the project company is in lemon state and on the assumption that dilution is 
low in this state (₱≥∂), the project company accept external financing as its assets is 
overvalued and external equity is cheap and therefore carry out the project. 
 
The critical issue here is that when the project company issues equity, outside investors 
usually worry that the management of the company may have unfavourable information. 
If so, the security can be overpriced. 
 
Suppose the project company would like to finance the gas pipeline project with debt. 
There is less worry with debt than equity .Debt securities are safer than equity, and their 
price is less affected if unfavourable news comes out later. However, there may be 
disagreement about risks if investors believe that the volatility of the project company`s 
assets is larger than what the company`s managers believe it is. This will make them 
demand for a higher face value on the debt instrument as well as a higher interest. 
 
The conclusion here is that an issue of equity would be read as “bad news” by investors 
and that the new stock the project company wants to issue may only be issued at a 
discount, hence difficulty in financing the gas project. A convertible debt, which can be 
viewed as a straight bond and warrant can however be designed since it is insensitive 
to risk. 
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4.6 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PROJECT FINANCING 
One of the merits of project financing is that it paves way for allocation of risks to the 
parties who can best manage them18. There are many fundamental risks that must be 
identified and allocated between the project sponsor and lenders. Risk is of high 
significance to both the equity investors and lenders as they both depend on the 
performance of the project in order to realize the benefits of their respective 
investments. The sponsors will seek to present the project to the financial market in the 
most favourable way with the objective of securing lender`s approval. While most 
sponsors of project are risk takers by the nature of their business activities, they still find 
it appealing sharing some risks with lenders in high stake projects19. The project risks 
are normally mitigated through their allocation in the contract agreement among all the 
parties involved in the project. The parties use the contract to cover their positions and 
interests. Some of the familiar risks are discussed below: 
 
Market Risk 
Market risk is the risk that the project company may not earn sufficient revenue to 
service its debt, operating cost and leave adequate returns for investors. It determines 
the self-liquidability of the entire project. Generally lenders are concerned about the 
market risk mostly where there is no established market for the project`s product. The 
two main variables which often influence the market risk are the demand and price of 
product. Demand risk is the risk that there will be no sufficient demand for the product to 
earn enough revenue to cover both investment and product costs. Price risk relates to 
the future prices becoming either too high or too low for the seller or buyer. Demand 
and Price Risks are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Completion Risk 
                                                          
18
 V. Smith, Project Finance Notes, (CEPMLP, University of Dundee, January 2007). 
19
 G.B. Greenwald, LNG Project Finance: Sharing Risks with Project Lenders in  Liquefied Natural Gas: 
Developing and Financing International Projects, 237 (1998). 
 
32 
 
This is the risk that the project will not be completed on time or at all. It also includes the 
probability of cost overruns and delays in completion resulting in increased interest and 
lengthening of repayment profile. For any project to generate adequate returns by way 
of revenue, it must have passed the completion test. One of the objectives of a lender 
embarking on financing of a project is to see the project completed to specification and 
operational to generate the required revenue stream to service repayment of interest 
and principal. Lenders seek to ensure that the completion phase of the project is 
completed in accordance with specification, time and within the cost budget. 
 
To mitigate against possible delay in the construction phase of the project, it is essential 
that such project is handled by professionals and contractor who has requisite skills, 
and managerial expertise. The risk could also be mitigated by the lender requiring the 
sponsors to provide completion guarantee and the sponsors in turn mitigate the risk by 
demanding contractor performance bonds from reputable financial institution. Where 
there are sub-contractors, the principal contractor must bear the risk. Liquidated 
damages must be paid by the contractors if the completion dates is not met and such 
amount must be adequate to cover interest payable on the debt for a reasonable 
period20. 
 
Political Risk 
Political risk involves threats to project due to events arising from the geo-political 
environment and the location of the project. Political risk is of high significance to gas 
projects in view of the natural resources exploitation and the cross border nature of the 
transactions. Political risk includes country risk and regulatory risk and can be in form of 
increase in taxation and royalty, imposition of land requirement, revocation of licences, 
nationalization or outright expropriation. They affect all aspect of the project from site 
selection and construction to completion, operations and marketing. Project sponsors 
assume this risk as much as possible; however where this is not possible, lenders will 
assume them. Project sponsor sometimes expose lenders to this risk to reduce the 
                                                          
20
 See Vinter supra  note 15, at 98. 
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possibility of outright expropriation. Russia and Venezuela in recent times are two good 
example of a country with serious political risk. In Russia the state gas monopoly, 
Gazprom used environmental issues to take 50% of the Sakhalin-2 project from Shell 
and its two Japanese partners, Mitsui and Mitsubishi21.  
 
Environmental Risks 
There can also be environmental risk which can be sub grouped under Political risks. By 
nature, it may not be a risk associated with the entire country of operation but the 
specific locality in which the company operates. In other words, isolated cases where a 
particular geographical grouping will make exploration activities of energy companies so 
difficult. A typical example of this is the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and Cabinda 
region of Angola where there are agitations and unrest for several years leading to 
lengthy disruptions to activities of oil companies operation in the region. These 
disruptions may also come during different phases of the project. 
 
Operating Performance Risk 
Operating Performance risk actually starts when the project cannot operate to 
specification. Lenders usually require full  compliance with operating specifications so 
as to ensure that the estimated project cash flows are not in way negatively affected 
The projected future cash flow of the project will be influenced by factors like unusually 
high operating cost, high raw materials, regulatory or environmental risks and market for 
the product. Lenders try to protect themselves against this risk by ensuring that the 
project company maintains ratios and loan covenants for maintenance of working 
capital, payment of dividend. 
 
Technological Risk 
Technology can be an operating risk if the technology is difficult to operate. The project 
may require more technical skills than the operator can provide or the technology. To 
mitigate technology driven operational risk, lenders must ensure that the project 
company management have the technical skills to handle the technology in use coupled 
                                                          
21
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1970104,00.html 
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with enough financial backing so that the cost of handling the technology does not have 
adverse effect on the cash flow of the company in paying back both the principal debt 
and interest element22.  
 
Foreign Exchange Risk 
Foreign Exchange Risk is the risk of fluctuation in foreign currencies. However, in a 
project where capital expenditure, operating expenses, revenue and borrowings are in 
the same currency, foreign exchange risk will not be a problem Foreign exchange risk is 
mitigated by means of derivatives like forward contracts, futures and swaps23. 
 
4.7 SPECIFIC RISKS IN GAS PROJECT FINANCING  
Force Majeure  
Force Majeure means an act of God, more or less a natural and inevitable catastrophe 
that interrupted the expected course of events. Risk occurs from events not directly 
resulting from the actions of the parties. Such risk deemed to be out of the parties 
control can exonerate them from the legal consequences of non-performance. 
Contracts in project financing should therefore specify events that constitute force 
majeure which will excuse performance and the legal consequences of each event.  
 
Events commonly included in the force majeure clause are war, strikes, lockouts and 
other labour disturbances, riots or public disturbances, expropriation, requisition, 
confiscation or nationalization, blockades or other closure or harbor or docks, severe 
storms and natural disasters, adverse weather conditions, epidemics and quarantines.. 
The allocation of force majeure is a much debated issue and the big question has 
always been who should be responsible and liable for the impact of an unforeseen 
event that occur independent of the fault of any of the parties. Insurance is commonly 
used in mitigating the effects of force majeure. 
 
 
                                                          
22
 See Donaldson supra note 74, at 8. 
 
23
 See Winfield supra note 42, at 149. 
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Reservoir Risk 
This is the risk that there is insufficient natural resources or the risk that natural 
resources is not in commercial quantity and satisfactory quality, thus reducing the 
potential of generating future cash flow needed to service loan. This form of risk is 
usually mitigated by the lenders` own valuation of the reservoir using a technical team. 
Lenders also bring their previous experience to bear as they have experts on their 
payroll. 
 
Volume Risk 
Volume risk is the risk that sufficient volume of gas will not be taken by the off taker or 
buyer to guarantee a minimum level of revenue for the project. It is usually addressed in 
the gas industry by the use of gas sales contract. Project sponsors usually ensure a 
minimum level of buyers before going ahead with construction and actual production of 
gas. The gas sales contract is meant to underpin the demand from buyers and ensure 
generation of cash streams to pay for the project. This is achieved by the means of 
“take or pay clause” in the sales agreement.  
 
The take or pay clause means that the off taker or buyer has been obliged to pay for a 
certain quantity of gas whether he was prepared to receive it or not. This ensures a 
smooth financial flow to defray the heavy capital cost of gas field development and 
pipeline construction. Often, however, the buyer could offset their payments against 
receiving gas at a later date in excess of the minimum they contracted for.  
 
The take or pay clause in the gas contract simply requires the off taker to pay for the 
gas regardless of his take. It also shows the willingness of the buyer to share risk with 
the lenders. Lenders will therefore seek to restrict the use of make up and carry forward 
rights and ensure that the take or pay levels are high as this would guarantee a higher 
level of revenue available for the project. Lenders will also carry out due diligence to 
ascertain the credit worthiness of the off taker24. 
                                                          
24
 M. Brothwood, The EU Gas Directive and Take or Pay Contracts, OGLTR 318(1998). 
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Price Risk 
This is the risk that prices may be too low that the seller will not earn enough revenue to 
cover the repayment of the loan or that the price may be too high and thus become 
uneconomical for the buyer. Usually, gas purchase agreement spans 20-25 years. The 
price to be paid for a commodity to be delivered over such a time frame requires careful 
and detailed consideration of several variables and exogenous factors. Uneconomic 
prices could either be that future realities make the price very high in comparison to 
other energy substitutes or too low to meet the capital cost requirement of the seller. To 
mitigate this risk, contract price for future deliveries of gas is usually indexed to the price 
of alternative of gas such as oil. Price risk for seller is also mitigated through the use of 
price ceiling. 
 
The emergence of spot market for gas could potentially undermine the relative price 
stability that has been a feature of the gas industry. Of concern to the lenders is the 
need to ensure a price range that will guarantee the ability of the project to meet debt 
obligations. The other form of price risks could be volatility of the gas price. Lenders 
want to be repaid in the manner and at time specified. Fluctuation of energy prices 
tends to create uncertainty which increases perceived risks associated with the project. 
The potential impact of price volatility or energy price risk on the economies of energy 
projects cannot therefore be overemphasized 
 
4.8 NEED FOR SECURITY 
Lenders usually demand for collateral to reduce their exposure in the advent of failure of 
the borrower`s business. Project finance lenders normally require security for the 
following reasons: 
i) In case of default on payment, bankruptcy and eventual wind up of the 
project, lenders want to rank first among creditors as there will be other 
creditors like suppliers of raw materials. 
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ii) In case the project turns out to be unsuccessful, lenders will want to sell the 
entire project to another party. 
iii) Where the project assets are fixed and there is no alternative use of the 
assets, the lenders may want to take over the assets pending when a market 
is found for them.  
 
Generally, lenders will usually wish to have security over all the assets of the project 
company as follows: 
i) Security interest over all fixed assets and property of the project company. 
ii) Charges of contractual rights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 WEST AFRICAN GAS PIPELINE PROJECT 
5.1 Background 
The West African Gas Pipeline Project is a transnational gas pipeline project in the 
West African Sub region being facilitated by the government of Benin, Ghana Nigeria 
and Togo. In 1982, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
mooted, as part of its key strategic economic policies to develop a natural gas pipeline 
throughout West Africa. This proposal was further strengthened by the feasibility study 
conducted on the possibility of supplying gas from Nigeria to Ghana. A feasibility report 
prepared for the World Bank in the early 1990s deemed that a pipeline to transport 
Nigerian gas to Benin, Togo and Ghana was commercially viable.  
 
In 1995, the government of the four nations signed a Heads of Government Agreement 
(HGA) pertaining to the pipeline. The HGA broadly outlined the principle of the pipeline 
development. In August 1998, a consortium of Chevron, Shell, NNPC, Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), SoBeGaz and SoToGaz signed an agreement 
commissioning a feasibility study on West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). The study 
which was completed in March 1999 concluded the commercial and technical viability of 
WAGP and projected that it could be operational as early as 2002. On August 1999, in 
Cotonou, Benin, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the four countries and 
the consortium establishing the legal framework for WAGP. The joint venture agreement 
naming Chevron as the WAGP project manager was signed on August 15, 1999 in 
Abuja, Nigeria. The four nations however signed an Inter-Governmental Agreement 
(IGA) in February 2000 and the agreement established the framework for realizing the 
pipeline venture. The IGA includes the government commitment to the pipeline owners 
and gas distributors on the conditions for the development, construction and operation 
of the WAGP as well as fiscal and custom policies for the venture. The project has 
received administrative support from the ECOWAS Secretariat and technical assistance 
($1.55million) from the United State Agency for International Development (USAID). 
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The treaty which is for a 20-year period provides for a comprehensive legal, fiscal and 
regulatory framework as well as a single authority for the implementation of the project. 
The project ownership was structured through a holding company. The West African 
Gas Pipeline Company (WAGPCO) has its shareholding as follows: Chevron Nigeria 
Ltd (35.7%), NNPC (25%), SPDC (18%), Ghana`s Volta River Authority 15.3%, 
SoBeGaz (2%) and SoToGaz (2%). WAGPCO is registered as a limited liability 
company in Bermuda and will be saddled with the day-to-day running of the pipeline. 
 
By the report of the United States Energy Information Agency (US EIA), Nigeria has the 
highest proven reserve of gas in the whole of Africa. It has about 184 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas reserves making it the seventh largest natural gas reserve holder in the 
world. West Africa to which Nigeria belong has approximately 32 percent of Africa`s 
total natural gas reserves. Other countries in this region include Ivory Coast (1.0 Tcf), 
Ghana (840 Bcf), and Benin (40 Bcf). 
 
Nigeria still flares about 40 percent of the natural gas it produces and re-injects about 
12 percent to enhance oil recovery. The World Bank reports that Nigeria account for 
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12.5% of the world`s total gas flaring. This is because many of Nigeria`s oil field lack the 
infrastructure to produce and market associated natural gas. 
 
According to Shell, about half of the 2 Bcf/d (Billion cubic feet per day) of associated 
gas (gaseous byproduct of oil extraction) is flared in Nigeria annually. This has thus 
paved way for new industry strategy geared towards collecting the associated gas and 
processing it into LNG which has greatly enhanced natural gas revenue while 
simultaneously reducing carbon emissions. 
 
The abundance of natural gas in Nigeria led to successful LNG project in 1999. Most of 
the natural gas used in Nigeria today is non-associated gas whereas the associated 
gases from oil exploration are usually flared. Although natural gas is still in early stage 
of use in the region, several projects are underway that would increase the future use of 
the resource. One of such projects is the West African Gas Pipeline Project. 
Incidentally, this project has faced lots of threats and risks of recent. 
 
41 
 
The West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) is the first transnational gas pipeline in the 
West African sub region. Today, the project is facing several challenges as all the 
countries involved have never dealt with any other country on pipeline projects before. 
WAGP is an initiative of Economic Community of West African States and was first 
proposed in 1982. There are four countries involved in this project namely Benin, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. The pipeline originates from Nigeria whose associated gas 
from Escravos field is to be used to supply the gas for the project. Principally, the 
project is to meet energy demand in Benin, Togo and Ghana. It will supply natural gas 
to the power plant in Ghana and some industries in the other countries.  
 
The West African Gas Project is projected to expand the gas market in the West African 
region over the next twenty years and estimated to create about 80, 000 jobs and 
reduce green house emission by 100 millions tons. 
 
5.2 PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 
The West African Gas Pipeline Project concerns the construction and operation of a 
regional gas transmission system that will supply gas produced in Nigeria to power 
stations in Togo, Benin and Ghana. The objective of setting up the project is to reduce 
the cost of electricity supply in Ghana, Togo and Benin by replacing oil with gas 
imported from Nigeria. Thus the West African Gas Pipeline is intended to transport 
natural gas to electricity generating companies and other industrial users in the sub 
region.  
 
5.3 PROJECT DETAILS   
The WAGP will traverse 520 miles (1,033 kilometers) both onshore and offshore from 
Nigeria`s Niger Delta region to its final planned terminus in Ghana. The first portion of 
the pipeline which will deliver gas to the greater Lagos area (Alagbado) is already in 
existence. The Escravos-Lagos Pipeline (ELP) was commissioned in 1989, supplying 
natural gas to Nigeria`s Egbin power plant and other industrial consumers in Lagos and 
Ogun state in the South Western part of Nigeria. ELP has a capacity to handle nearly 
900 Mmcf/d of natural gas but currently the majority of this capacity is not utilized. The 
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spare capacity of the ELP will be used to move gas from Escravos in Niger Delta area 
of Nigeria to the WAGP. A 34-mile (57 kilometer) onshore portion of the WAGP will run 
from Alagbado to Seme beach in Lagos state, Nigeria. The WAGP will continue offshore 
with proposed landfall spurs at Cotonou (Benin), Lome (Togo), Tema (Ghana), Takoradi 
(Ghana) and Effasu (Ghana). The initial capacity of the WAGP will be 200 Mmcf/d with 
the capacity to expand to 500 Million cubic feet per day as demand grows. 
 
The associated gas currently being flared in Nigeria is to be used in the project with 
back up from non-associated gas. Open Access will occur such that anyone can supply 
or transport gas through WAGP after volume has exceeded 200MMscfd after 10 years, 
whichever occur first. Gas discoveries in Benin and Togo will be granted immediate 
access to the pipeline. 
 
This will result in less environmental pollution in Nigeria. More importantly is the fact that 
the industrial users in the four countries are to benefit from the project. The industries in 
Benin, Togo and Ghana are also to utilize part of the transported gas as well as the new 
power plants being constructed in Ghana. Ghana has agreed to take up 85% of the total 
capacity of the gas volume to be transported to its gas plant on a take or pay basis. 
There have been several shifts in the above proposal due to protest from various 
communities in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria. This has led to delay in the construction 
work which shifted the project commencement date from 2005 to 2007  
 
5.4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WAGP 
Transnational gas pipeline project that cut across two or more countries are usually 
affected by domestic and international laws. The WAGP is not an exception as it has an 
offshore element. Transit Offshore Pipelines on high sea and continental shelf are 
protected by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. There are a number 
of legal instruments that deal with transit issues on pipelines  
 
Some of them include the 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedom of 
Transit, 1947 Article V General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Article 7, Energy 
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Charter Treaty. It must however be pointed out that the details of these instruments are 
beyond the scope of this research work 
 
5.5 THEORETICAL MODEL ON THIRD PARTY ACCESS 
At this point, I present and apply the Hannesson discussed in chapter two as it relates 
to the West African Gas Pipeline Project. Here we have West African Gas Pipeline 
Company (WAGPCO) as the single buyer and one producer (Nigeria) as the single 
seller (Bilateral monopoly)  
 
Suppose a supplier delivers to a gas company in another country, which in turn sells the 
gas to many local distribution companies. In all probability, the pipeline company will 
face a downward sloping demand schedule for gas to be sold to the local distribution 
companies. If the pipeline company buys the gas from the producer at a Price P that 
depends on the total quantity sold (Q), the profit of the pipeline company (πt) can be 
expressed as  
 
(1)    Πt = P (Q)Q- CtQ  
Ct is transport cost per unit of gas transported. Here, I am assuming that transportation 
cost shall be fixed. 
  
The first order condition of equation (1) representing the maximization of the pipeline 
company will be 
 
(2)    P+P’Q ( = MR) = S+Ct  
 
This means the company will like to sell the quantity where the marginal revenue (MR) 
is equal to its marginal cost (MC). In this case, the marginal cost is sum of the unit 
transport cost and the price to be paid to the producer for obtaining the gas. Since the 
price of the gas is not independent of the quantity the pipeline company decides to buy 
from the producer, the former will have to bargain with the latter over the price it pays 
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and the quantity it sells and the producer will consider the possible collection of price 
and quantity he can get.  
 
With a given unit cost Cp of producing the gas, the profit of the producer (πp) will be 
(3)    πp =(S- Cp)Q 
 
Each party will obviously want to maximize its own profit but there is no single solution 
that optimizes each party`s profit simultaneously. Obviously, there are numerous 
possibilities to this kind of “cake” dividing problems and one of such will be to divide the 
cake equally. 
 
The sum of the profits will therefore be  
(4)      Πt + πp = P(Q)Q- SQ-CtQ+ (S-Cp)Q 
  
This can be further expressed as P(Q)Q- (Ct + Cp) 
 
The variable S in equation (4) is the price at which the pipeline company buys gas from 
the producer. The role of S there is to divide the profits between the two parties. 
 
The first order condition of equation (4) will be 
(5)  P+P’Q (= MR) = Ct + Cp 
 
This is actually similar to the optimal solution obtained in figure 1 in chapter two (the 
point Pm Qm) for the pipeline company as a monopolist. The difference is however the 
price the pipeline company pays to the producer. So, the best solution in this case 
would be when the producer and the pipeline company get the same profit, i. e  
 
(6)     S = Cp + ½ (P- Ct - Cp) 
 
This means the producer gets a fair price that covers his unit cost of production and 
gives him half of the profit per unit. 
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Proposition- How would Third party Access Affects this solution? 
If we look at a simple world of bilateral monopoly, it would mean that the pipeline 
company would be obliged to allow the producer access to its pipeline at a tariff that 
would only make the pipeline company earn a normal return on its investment. Thus, 
the producer would most likely get all the profit because he would limit his sales to 
whatever maximizes his profit, which in this case will be the monopoly quantity and a 
sufficient higher price. 
 
Here, I conclude that the implication of third party access in a market for gas with a 
pipeline company (West African Gas Pipeline Company) as the single buyer and Nigeria 
as the sole producer will be to concentrate absolute monopoly power in the hands of the 
producer.   
 
5.6 FINANCING OF WAGP  
The West African Gas Pipeline project is being funded by the sponsors through the 
project company, WAPCO with guarantees provided by the World Bank. It was 
estimated to cost about $590m to $600m.The World Bank in 2004 approved guarantees 
totaling $125m to mitigate political risks linked to natural gas sales to state owned 
power companies.  
The European Investment Bank also gave 70m euro representing a significant share of 
Ghana participation in the project. However information available indicated that the 
project completion cost is expected to gulp about $1.1billion. The major incentive for the 
sponsor is the ability of the project to improve the competitiveness of the energy sector 
in Ghana, Benin and Togo by promoting the use of cheaper and environmentally 
cleaner gas from Nigeria. 
 
5.7 FUTURE OF WAGP 
The West African Gas Project being the first of its kind in West African sub region 
portends some strategic opportunities for the four participating countries and the sub 
region as a whole. These can be described as follows: 
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Reduction in Gas Flaring 
WAGP provides an opportunity for Nigeria to export her associated gas which is being 
flared because there is no domestic market yet in place in the country. Nigeria is 
currently responsible for about 12.5% of total global gas flaring according to World bank 
Report. Gas flaring is inimical to both the environment and the people of Niger Delta 
area of Nigeria. In addition, scientific research has also proven that it can lead to 
leukemia and premature death. 
 
Export Market  
Currently, a significant portion of Nigeria`s natural gas is processed into LNG. Nigeria`s 
most ambitious natural gas project is the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) facility 
on Bonny Island. Coupled with LNG, Nigeria plans to export some of its gas via West 
African Gas Pipelines which is expected to be completed before end of 2010. Income 
from exportation of gas is expected to boost the revenue base of Nigeria. 
 
Promotion of Regional Cooperation 
The West African Gas Project is further strengthening mutual interest among the 
member nations of ECOWAS especially the four participating countries. Nigeria is for 
instance playing a major role in the stability of political regimes of Togo, Benin Republic 
etc. Nigerian owned companies are presently foraying into neighbouring States like 
Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin Republic etc. Banks, Insurance 
firms and Manufacturing entities from Nigeria currently have a good number of branches 
and subsidiaries in countries like Benin, Ghana, Togo and other member nations of 
ECOWAS. 
 
Improved Power Generation 
There are about 16 member nations that constitute ECOWAS and nearly all the 
countries do not have capacity to meet power demand. Though Nigeria is currently 
building some power plants nationwide, the completion of WAGP will provide means to 
buy cheap gas for use in power plant.  
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Development of Gas Market in West African Sub region 
The completion of WAGP will ensure the development of a gas market in the West 
African sub region. There are a number of companies in Nigeria whose production 
capacity is heavily dependent on energy. In addition, firms like West African Cement 
plant in Togo as well as OTP Phosphate Manufacturing Plant in Ghana are among the 
many companies which may likely benefit from such gas market. It is expected that 
such energy intensive industries will rely on WAGP to a great extent for the supply of 
natural gas for energy use. 
 
Proposed Trans-Saharan Pipeline 
Nigeria and Algeria continue to discuss the feasibility of constructing a Trans-Saharan 
Gas Pipeline (TSGP). The proposed pipeline will originate from WAGP base and then 
traverse through Niger Republic to Algeria. 
 
Revenue from Transit Fee 
As prevalent with most pipelines that traverse between two or more countries, transit 
fees will be charged on the pipelines passing through Benin and Togo. However, the 
two countries had mutually agreed not to earn transit fee for a fixed period of time. 
 
5.8 THREATS TO COMPLETION OF WAGP 
The West African Gas Project will face a host of challenges ranging from capacity 
utilization, security of supply, pricing of gas etc. These are discussed as follows 
 
PRICING 
The demand for natural Gas, like any other commodity that has perfect substitutes will 
typically depend on its pricing relative to the alternatives available. Unlike Europe where 
environmental regulation play a significant factor in gas pricing, environmental 
friendliness of gas least play any role in this regard as there is no government regulation 
in reducing carbon emissions in the West African sub-region. This therefore suggests 
that gas supply from WAGP must be sold on competitive basis in order to attract 
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different industrial users. However, the position of Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company on gas pricing has been a source of dispute with WAGP promoters and 
potential customers. 
 
CAPACITY UTILISATION 
Due to the fact that demand for gas by industrial users has been projected to increase 
over the period, this poses a significant threat to the commercial viability of the project 
especially with the cost overrunning from $800m to $1.2bn. In addition, the possibility 
that the industrial users in Ghana can use the excess capacity is also uncertain as this 
is more likely going to depend on economic growth of the countries. 
 
ABILITY OF BUYERS TO PAY 
There still remains a significant doubt as regards whether consumers will be able to pay 
for the supply of gas. For instance, Ghana who had previously signed up 85 per cent of 
the total volume of gas on a take or pay basis defaulted in fulfilling her obligation to 
Ivory Coast for importation of electricity. This therefore suggests that there might be 
difficulty in mitigating the sellers risk in the event that Ghana defaults in payment as the 
main off-taker of gas. 
 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
The commercial viability of the West African Gas Pipeline Project is also under threat 
due to incessant attack from the militant in Niger Delta Region where the pipeline is 
expected to take its supply of gas. The militants have in the past blown up several 
pipelines which affected supply of crude oil in the international market. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
Risks in any project are inevitable. Financing gas pipeline projects anywhere in the 
world is a risky venture, whether through equity or project financing. However, the 
chances of success of any project can be increased when risk is carefully evaluated, 
prioritized and controlled. 
 
The operation of the West African Gas Pipeline would reveal a situation of bilateral 
monopoly in the West African Gas Market in the future. As fully exploited using the 
Hannesson model, the far reaching effect of third party access in a world of monopoly 
between the West African Gas Pipeline Company and the gas producer, Nigeria in this 
case would be to concentrate absolute market power in the hands of Nigeria. Therefore, 
the final buyers will have less to gain. 
 
The West African Gas Pipeline Project like all other transnational gas pipelines has 
several threats that can mar its successful completion. While the threats pointed out 
earlier pose a serious challenge to the project sponsors, adequate planning as well as 
concerted efforts from all the parties involved could mitigate these threats. 
 
It is imperative to argue that the attendant opportunities likely to be created by this 
project outweigh the threats. Some other threats may come up when the project 
becomes operational but mitigating such threats will depend on the contingency plan 
put in place. 
 
Clearly, third party access would not provide much benefit to customers in a world of 
single supplier but would it happen in the world of continental Europe with three external 
suppliers, Norway, Russia and Algeria. This question is not fully answered but would 
probably depend on the strength of third party access across international borders. 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOKS 
Rognvaldur Hannesson  Petroleum Economics  
 
Cameron, P., Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 
Clifford C., Project Finance, (London: IFR Publishing Ltd., 1994). 
 
Donaldson T.H., (ed.) Project Lending, (London: Butterworths, 1992). 
 
Greenwald, G. (ed.), Liquefied Natural Gas: Developing and Financing International 
Energy Projects (London, England: Kluwer Law International, 1998). 
 
International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Information, (2004). 
 
MacAvoy, P., The Natural Gas Market Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation 
(London: Yale University Press, 2000). 
 
Martyn D., Natural Gas Agreements (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2002). 
 
Martyn D., Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996). 
 
Nevitt, P.K., and Fabozzi, F.J., Project Financing (7th Edition) (London: Euromoney 
Books, 2000). 
 
51 
 
Oliver M.S. and Marshall, E.A., Company Law, (12th edition) (London: Pitman 
Publishing, 1994). 
 
Vinter, G., Project Finance A Legal Guide, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998). 
 
Wood, R., Law and Practice of International Finance: Project Finance, Subordinated 
Debt and State Loans. (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995). 
 
ARTICLES IN A BOOK 
Greenwald. G.B, LNG Project Finance, in Liquefied Natural Gas: Developing and 
Financing International Energy Projects, 237, (Greenwald, ed., London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998). 
 
Griffin, P., Transnational Gas Projects and their Agreements, in Natural Gas 
Agreements, 69 (Martyn R. David, ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2002). 
 
Trimble, N., Gas Sales Agreements, in Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements, 42 (Martyn 
R. David ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996). 
 
Winfield D., Oil and Gas Financing, in Upstream Oil and Gas Agreements,137 (Martyn 
R. David ed., London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996). 
  
ARTICLES IN JOURNALS 
Griffin, P. Changing Markets and Contracts of the LNG Business, No 21 J.E.N.R.L. 85-
96, (2003). 
 
Kensinger J., & Martin J.D., Project Finance: Raising Money the Old-Fashioned Way, 
No 1 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 69-81 (1988). 
 
Mills S., Project Financing of Oil and Gas Field Developments. No 4 Oil & Gas Law and 
Taxation Review, 4 (1996). 
52 
 
 
Zakaiya, H., The Petroleum Lending Program of the World Bank, No 17 Journal of 
World Trade Law 417 (1983). 
 
OTHERS SOURCES 
 
Ahn, H., Transnational Pipeline Gas Projects in Northeast Asia: Factors Affecting the 
Development and International Legal Perspectives, (CEPMLP, 2000). 
 
Stevens, P., A History of Transit Pipelines in the Middle East: Lessons for the future, 
(CEPMLP, 1996). 
 
Stevens, P., Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects, (ESMAP, 
2003). 
 
Vinogradov, S., Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines International Legal and Regulatory 
Regimes, (AIPN Study, 2001). 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1970104,00.html (Last Date visited 20 May 2010) 
 
http://www.distrigas.eu/content/germany/de-en/natural-gas-de-en/european-market-de-en.html ((Last Date 
visited 14 November 2009) 
 
http://www.moffatt-associates.com/energy_services/forecasting_market_trends/energy(Last Date visited 5 
January 2010) 
 
http://www.nam.org/Resource-Center/Export-Promotion/Market-Research/Market- 
Research/~/media/8E9445F4E8374E16A2CC77E4341CF738.ashx (Last Date visited 15 April 2010) 
Economic Community of West African States 
http://www.ecowas.int/ (last visited on 21 May 2010). 
 
 
